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The topic which has been assigned to me, "Classification Today-
Shadow or Substance," might more appropriately have come at the end
of the Institute, rather than the beginning. If I could convince you that
our pursuit of valid classifications was the pursuit of a shadow, there
would be no reason to listen to the papers on the remaining part of the
program. We could all pack up and go home. Hence, I must conclude
that when those who planned this Institute gave me this topic, they as-
sumed that regardless of what I might say about classification, I would
certainly be unable to demonstrate its ephemeral or shadowy nature
and that I would conclude that classification had substantial value for
librarianship and related information activities.
Confronted with this dilemma, it occurred to me that the way out
for an erstwhile student of logic like myself might be found in the first
instance not in examining the nature of shadows nor the nature of sub-
stances, but in examining the meaning of the connective between them,
namely, the logical operator "or." Most of us, when we think of the
word "or," think of it in the exclusive sense as meaning "either or,"
that is, the word used in this title, "Shadow or Substance," would or-
dinarily be interpreted to mean that if classification were substantial
it could not be shadowy, or if it were shadowy, it could not be substan-
tial. There is, however, another meaning of "or" which is the usual
meaning attributed to it in works of logic, where the "or" is taken as
meaning logical disjunction with reference to propositions and logical
sum with reference to classes. In this sense "or" means "and/or"
rather than "either or." Thus if I say "It will rain tomorrow or I will
stay home," both statements could be true; that is, it might rain tomor-
row and I could still stay home. Similarly, if I say of an item that it is
a member of the class A or B, it could be a member of A, a member
of B, or a member of AB, and the general proposition "X is a member
of A or B" is true in all three cases. This general proposition is only
false when the item is a member of neither A nor B. This logical re-
lation can be illustrated by the truth table for disjunction at the top of
the following page.
Now then, if we assume that the "or" in the title is the "or" of
logical disjunction, then it is possible for me to take the line that clas-
sification in some sense is substantial, in some sense is shadowy, and
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in some sense is both. My text, then, becomes one of indicating the
sense in which it is substantial and in warning against the sense in
which it is shadowy, so that you will be able to judge subsequent papers
in this Institute in this context.
We must admit in the beginning that the concern of librarianship
with problems of classification represents one of the oldest and strong-
est links of librarianship with basic intellectual and theoretical ques-
tions. As a first year student in library school many years ago, John
Lund and I found that questions of classification constituted an intellec-
tual oasis in a barren waste of learning how many spaces should go
between the author and title in descriptive cataloguing, or how one col-
lates a book when the publisher has gotten mixed up in his numbering
procedure. Hence, the earliest contribution I attempted to make to the
art or science of librarianship was a paper on classification. Some of
you may have read it. It was called "A Non- Expansive Classification
System" and it appeared in the Library Quarterly 1 over twenty years
ago. In this paper we took the line that a classification system cover-
ing all knowledge for all time was certainly chimerical or, as the title
assigned to me has it, "shadowy." Hence, we felt that in order to save
classification as an intellectual activity for librarianship, it would be
necessary to set up our major classes in terms of time divisions; that
is to say, the major classes we recommended, instead of being such
things as science, literature, art, etc., were historical epochs. We
thought it possible that within these hjstnrira.1 epochs one might con-
struct adequate classifications; and by this we meant not classifica-
tions of knowledge, but .c lass if ications of library material itself. One
of the major considerations which led us to this conclusion was some-
thing we were taught very early in library school. We were taught that
the Dewey system was a theoretical system which attempted to legis-
late for books and that its pigeonholes were created independently of
a concern with the content of the pigeonholes. We were taught at the
same time that the great advantage of the Library of Congress classi-
fication system was that it was made from the books themselves and
based upon an empirical study of the material at the Library of Con-
gress. Hence one could say that the pigeonholes or classes in the Li-
brary of Congress classification system were actually designed to con-
tain the material in the Library and therefore one could predict an ex-
cellent fit. From such an argument, however, it is a simple matter to
draw the conclusion that the Library of Congress classification might
have fitted the contents of the Library of Congress at the time it was
made, but that for future materials to be received by the Library of
Congress, the classification system took on the same theoretical and
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predictive character as the Dewey system; that is to say, once the pi-
geonholes were set up, all new material would have to be fitted into
the pre-existing pigeonholes. Hence, with reference to new material,
the Library of Congress system differs from the Dewey system only
in having different pigeonholes. It was this predictive character that
a classification system based on temporal epochs was designed to
avoid. We felt that the great virtue of the Library of Congress system,
namely, its development from an actual examination of the material to \
be classified, could always be retained if new classifications were set / \
up as required by the changing pattern of literature.
In the twenty years that have elapsed since this paper, I have seen
no reason to weaken its conclusions but I am now convinced that Dr.
Lund and I did not go far enough. At that time we did recognize a
changing pattern of literature. What we overlooked were the different
interests which might exist in the same historical epoch. Now we
would say that not only is it necessary to make classifications for dif-
ferent periods of time but that it is necessary to make classifications
for different special purposes.
It is not my intention to give you a biographical sketch at this time
based upon the various papers that I have written about classification,
but Anatole France once described literary criticism as "the adven-
tures of a soul among masterpieces." He meant by this expression
that the important thing about literary criticism was not the book crit-
icized, but the nature of the critic. Hence, I feel that I can best carry
out my assignment at this Institute by telling you of the various consid-
erations and the steps along the way which have led to my present con-
clusions about classification in librarianship.
In 1950 I was privileged to give an opening paper at a similar Insti-
tute, although the title of the Institute was different. I refer to the In-
stitute on Bibliographical Organization held at the University of
Chicago at the Fifteenth Annual Conference of the Graduate Library
School. At that Conference I was assigned the topic "The Functional
Approach to Bibliographical Organization." 2 In preparing that paper
I felt that my first obligation was to define the concept of function, and
following suggestions from the biological sciences, I concluded that
a function could only be defined in terms of purposes. Hence, a func-
tional approach to bibliographical organization could only mean an
analysis of bibliographical organization in terms of its purposes. I
concluded, then, that there were no universal purposes and hence that
there could not be any universal bibliographical organizations. This \
indicated that the Universal Decimal Classification is certainly "shad-
owy" since it assumes that the scientific and intellectual enterprises
of all men everywhere could be subsumed under a universal purpose.
Certainly we can say that an increase of knowledge is the universal
purpose of all scientific and intellectual endeavor, but what is requirec
here is not such a general and vague universal purpose but a universal
purpose in terms of which we can design and construct an elaborate
system of major classes, sub- classes, sub-sub-classes, etc., into
|
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which we can organize the products of all intellectual endeavor. I did
not believe then and I do not believe now that this is even a remotely
feasible enterprise. Hence our conclusion at that time was that differ-
ent individuals or different groups should determine the specific bibli-
ographical organization necessary to their own purposes. I suggested
that these special purposes might be related by having each special
group make its selection of major class, sub- class, sub- sub- class,
etc., from a common vocabulary. Let me say at this time, parentheti-
cally, that at the present time I despair of even such a universal appa-
ratus as a common vocabulary for all sciences.
Aside from my theoretical interest in the problem of classification,
I had learned a good deal about its nature and utility from working in
libraries, and one of the things I did learn from working in both large
and small libraries was that for most such institutions, classification
has become a method of shelving books and has ceased to be, if it ever
was, a way of organizing the information in such books. This was
brought home to me most clearly in my years at the Library of Con-
gress. The Library of Congress, as you know, has closed stacks. The
approach to the content of these stacks is through the standard type of
dictionary catalogue. Beyond the dictionary catalogue, those who con-
sult its collections use the standard type of printed bibliographies,
e.g., Chemical Abstracts, Physical Abstracts, the publications of H. W.
Wilson and Company, Public Affairs Information Service, etc. It there-
fore seemed that the effort expended in setting up and maintaining an
elaborate system of close classification is wasteful, since it has no
real impact on the users of the Library. Of course, I knew that there
remained within the system of American libraries a number of institu-
tions, such as the Crerar Library and the Engineering Society's Li-
brary in New York, which utilize classed catalogues, but it still re-
mains true that in general, classification is not a major tool for the
use of contents of libraries. Certainly I was also aware of the very
great value of classification as a method of arranging books in open
shelf libraries, mainly public libraries or small academic libraries;
but I felt in this instance that these classifications had a special pur-
pose, namely, making available to the general reader a rough break-
down of books which reflected a similar rough breakdown of the inter-
ests of the general reader, i.e., fiction, travel, science, religion, etc.
I should like at this time to refer to just one other previous paper
which we did on this subject. In 1953 we prepared a report for the
Office of Naval Research on "Machines and Classification in the Or-
ganization of Information." This report was published in Volume II,
Studies in Coordinate Indexing. In this report I raised the following
question: Why, in the face of a general decline in interest of problems
of classification in regular library organizations, was there such a re-
newed interest in the problem among documentation people and people
who were concerned with machine searching of information?
How then do we account for the renewed interest in classification as
a method of information control? Within the last few years, we have
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witnessed the birth (and in some cases, the rapid death) of dozens of
new classification systems, among which we can name, The Story of
Classification for the Army Technical Reference Service; the Office of
Naval Research Project Status Classification; the Research and Devel-
opment Board Classification of Research Projects; the American Soci-
ety for Metals- Special Libraries Association Metallurgical Literature
Classification, and the Standard Aeronautical Indexing System. There
has been a revival of interest in the Universal Decimal Classification,
in the Patent Office Classification, and in Ranganathan's Colon Classi-
fication. Western Reserve University has labored for several years
and is still laboring on the development of "abstraction ladders" and
"semantic factoring."
This renewed search for the solution to an unsolvable problem re-
sults from a paradox, namely, the promise of machine organization
and retrieval of information, and the actual slowness of the machine in
the linear searching of an index. Classification becomes one of the
methods proposed for dividing an index in order to shorten the time
required for a machine search.
Let us suppose we are searching for the name "Baker, Able
Charlie" in a village telephone book containing about 1,000 names. To
search for this name might take a minute or two, occupied with pick-
ing up the book, finding the proper page and column, and scanning the
proper column for the name being sought. Now it is quite practical to
utilize an IBM machine, or some similar machine, or even a deck of
edge-notched cards, to find one name in a random file of a thousand
names, in about the same time required for the manual search of an
alphabetical file in a minute or two. But suppose we are looking for
the name "Baker, Able Charlie" in a list of a million names compar-
able to the New York telephone book. It might take us a little longer
to lift the heavier book, to find the right page and the right column, and
to scan by the given names and address as well as the last name. Nev-
ertheless, the time required for a search for one name in an alphabet-
ical list of a million names is of the same order of magnitude as the
time required to find one name in an alphabetical list of a thousand
names. But a machine search for one name in a random list of a mil-
lion names will take one thousand times as long as a machine search
for one name in a thousand.
It was the more or less vague realization of this fact that led the
early advocates of the application of punched- card machines for the
organization and retrieval of information to recognize that machine
methods could not be applied efficiently to the random searching of
large masses of information. No machine search of a large random
list can approach the speed with which the mind can jump to the exact
position in an ordered list. It would be silly to randomize a list of
names in a phone book, or subject headings in an alphabetical index, in
order to search for any particular name or heading with punched- card
machines. An ordered list when it is over a certain size always en-
ables the mind which recognizes and utilizes the order to beat the
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machine. The conclusion to be drawn here is that contrary to popular
misconceptions, the larger the number of qualitatively different units
in a linear system of information, the less applicable are standard
punched- card systems or even magnetic tape systems to the problem
of searching; and this conclusion leads, in turn, to a search for
(1) ways to cut down the size of indexes; and (2) ways to prefile or
classify items of information.
So long as it seemed that machines could only be used for linear
search of large files of information, the search for classification sys-
tems which could divide such files hierarchically or in any other way,
although doomed to defeat, still appeared to be necessary. However,
in recent years machine searching of literature has with rare excep-
tions adopted the method of look-up and coordination, rather than lin-
ear scanning, and this means that it is no longer necessary to invent
classification systems in order to make machine search of informa-
tion feasible or economic and practicable.
Some of those who wished to use classification in machine search-
ing systems developed the notion of generic coding. This large mouth-
ful means nothing more than the use of subordinate digits to indicate
subordinate topics, which every student of librarianship learns in
learning the Dewey Decimal system. For example, 500 is science in
general; 510 is mathematics; 520 is astronomy; 511 is arithmetic; 521
is theoretic astronomy; 511.3 is prime numbers; 521.3 is orbits, etc.
The advantage of such coding for machine systems lies in the ability
to search by a portion of the number rather than the whole number.
For example, if I search for everything on 51 , I pick up everything
on prime numbers, without asking or knowing that anything is in the
system on prime numbers. There are some people who feel that this
type of generic searching is necessary for machine systems. This is
most usually the case in the field of chemistry, where instead of
searching for a specific compound I may wish to search for all amines
or all chlorides or all purines, etc. It has been felt that the coding for
any specific compound which is an amine should also contain the coding
for amines as a generic group. Without going too much into detail on
this matter, it can be said that this type of generic coding is totally
unnecessary in order to make generic searching possible. Further-
more, it is much more expensive than other methods of carrying out
generic searches. In a study of the cost of generic coding which we
published in 1956 3 based upon a study of the number of digits being
employed in some of the systems being experimented with by the Pat-
ent Office, we determined that generic coding would increase the size
of a mechanical store by a factor of three to one, as compared to other
and simpler methods of carrying out generic searches. Since that time
our conclusions have been reinforced by the attempt made by the Na-
tional Bureau of Standards to develop a system of generic coding for
compounds. The system developed by the Bureau of Standards used so
many digits that the computer was in actual fact slower in its look-up
procedure than an individual turning over and examining cards in a
3x5 drawer.
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If it is the case that all classification systems so far produced or
suggested have shown themselves to be inadequate as instruments of
such bibliographical control, and if it is the case that such systems
are not necessary for mechanized retrieval of information, why, may
we ask, must we continually be faced with the problem of laying the
ghost of classification or dissipating its shadows in the clear light of
analysis? This has been a problem which has troubled me for some
time. The issue seems so clear and yet we have this recurrent inter-
est in and time spent on the theory and problem of classification in li-
brarianship. I found the answer to this question in the "Report of Con-
clusions and Recommendations" issued by the International Study Con-
ference on Classification for Information Retrieval, held at Beatrice
Webb House, Dorking, England, May 13th - 17th, 1957. In a certain
sense the classification group which has been started in this country
and this Conference itself may be considered reactions to the Dorking
Conference. In studying the conclusions and recommendations of this
Conference, Paragraph (1), called "The Scope of Classification,"
gives us our clue:
Traditional classification has been concerned with the construc-
tion of hierarchies of terms - chains of classes and co-ordinat-
ed arrays. Modern information retrieval techniques also neces-
sitate the combination of terms to express complex subjects.
This conference takes the term 'classification' to include the
problems raised by both these forms of relation. Some mem-
bers use the term 'codification' for this field of study.
This is a complicated way of saying what earlier defenders of clas-
sification have said, namely, that all intellectual organization is clas-
sification and that even such things as alphabetical indexing or numer-
ical arrays are species of classification. It is said that no matter how
much we try to get away from classification, we must come back to it.
And thus we see the Dorking Conference, which was presumably called
to deal with classification as a specific method of organizing informa-
tion, generalized the term so that classification became the name for
any method of organizing information. We wish to do more at this
point than quarrel about the meaning of words. Hence, we will admit
that there is a sense in which all intellectual activity involves classi-
fication. The modern theory of arithmetic involves the notion that all
numbers are classes, that is, one is the class of all classes having a
single member, two is the class of all doubles, three is the class of
all triples, etc., that is to say, a number is a class of classes. Fur-
ther, it is certainly true that any general term involves the notion of
class. Any word which does more than point or indicate this or that,
is a word connoting or denoting a class. For example, I can point to a
particular color, but I cannot use the term "red" without implying a
class of shades, or the term "color" without implying a class of hues.
When I use a man's name as the entry in a descriptive catalogue, his
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name becomes the class of all items written by him. In an alphabet-
ical catalogue any subject heading is the class of all items which follow
it in the catalogue. Certainly in this sense we must admit that all in-
tellectual endeavor involves classification and that if we use the word
"classification" in this wide sense, then all particular systems of or-
ganizing information are species of or varieties of classification. But
on this point there is no quarrel nor really any reason to hold the type
of Institute we are now holding. It seems to me that if we have a con-
ference on classification, or if someone is asked to read a paper on
wnether classification is substantial or shadowy, there must be im-
plied that there are other forms of organization of information, other
forms of library organization, to which the term "classification" does
not apply. In other words, if we say that a dictionary catalogue is a
classed catalogue in just the same sense in which the John Crerar Li-
brary catalogue is a classed catalogue, then the question of whether
we should have classed catalogues or dictionary catalogues becomes
meaningless, sort of like saying that "A includes B and B is not in-
cluded in A." This is a flat contradiction. What we must look for,
then, both at the present time and in the following papers presented at
this Institute, is a definition of classification which distinguishes it
from other forms of organization and which permits an evaluation of
classification as contrasted with an evaluation of other forms of or-
ganizing information. Unless we make this distinction, all of our dis-
cussion from now on will be shadowy and essentially meaningless. I
wish, then, to offer a simple definition of classification as librarians
have always used it which distinguishes it from other forms of organ-
ization. And here, if you will forgive me, we must utilize some sim-
ple logical notions to make this problem clear.
(1) The product of any two classes is a class, as illustrated
by the following diagram:
In this diagram A is a class, B is a class, AB is a class.
(2) The sum of any two classes is a class; that is, "A or B" is
a class.
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(3) Given the situation where A includes B, AB is a class, but
the class B not A is null; that is, it has no members.
The class B is included in the class A, when all the mem-
bers of class B are also members of class A.
A library classification system like the Dewey system, the L.C.
system, the U.D.C. system, etc., may now be defined as follows:
There are a set of main classes, illustrated as follows:
All sub- classes are included in only one main class:
And this relation of inclusion continues, no matter how far we
carry this subdivision; thus, all sub- sub- classes are included in only
one sub- class:
v @)\ }> x v x
It seems to me that those who defend classification systems are
saying that knowledge, books, or the information in books can be or-
ganized in this way and that an organization carried out in this manner
will serve the interests of scientific research and other intellectual
activities. In terms of logic, class inclusion is only a special case of
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class intersection. For example, two standard theorems in any logi-
cal work are:
(y) (x) xnycx: The product of x and y is included in x
(y) (x) xcxuy: x is included in the sum of x and y
This is equivalent to saying that class inclusion can be defined in a
Boolean system of products, sums and complements.
Where, then, does the issue lie? We have first rejected the notion
that classification is a purely general notion and insisted upon its dis-
tinction from other types of organization. Now it appears we have in-
sisted on the general character of Boolean relations and have pointed
out that hierarchical classification or class inclusion is only a special
relationship within Boolean algebra. What issue, then, remains? For
myself, I think there isn't any, but historically there have been two
issues which may provide substance in addition to shadow during the
coming deliberations of this Conference. There have been metaphysi-
cians, philosophers, and even some scientists, notably certain bota-
nists and zoologists, who have insisted that in addition to the mathe-
matical notion of class there do exist in the world real classes or
archetypes. These men would say that the class of geraniums is much
more real than the class which anyone may set up which has as its
members any two flowers, e.g., a geranium and a rose. These men
would say that the class of red things is more real than the class of
colored things. Following this line, it would be said that scientific
investigation will disclose that the universe and all the items in it are
organized in a set of real classes and that the business of library
classification or any other type of classification is not to make classes
but to discover such classes. It is my present feeling that there are
no serious scientists who still hold this position, at least not since
the development and popularization of the theory of evolution and since
the development of Boolean algebra in the middle of the Nineteenth
Century. Let me remind you that it is traditional in library literature
to recognize that Dewey was very much influenced by Harris, that
Harris was an Hegelian, and that Hegelians are a species of unscien-
tific German metaphysicians who believe that all reality is constituted
by an hierarchy of classes reaching up to the Prussian State as the
class of all classes. I would say further that the emphasis on real
classes in this sense in librarianship is a cultural lag which should be
eliminated at this time.
There remains one other problem. It might be said that an empir-
ical investigation of how men actually organize knowledge or write
books discloses that some classes are better than others and that
some classes include other classes and that a good library organiza-
tion should reflect this empirical fact of how people study, do research,
or use libraries. This is a valid point of view and if the empirical
facts could be demonstrated, then a library classification based upon
such empirical facts would certainly be useful. On the other hand, if
the librarians make classifications for themselves based upon theo-
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retical considerations and insist that the users of libraries modify
their own interests or own groupings in order to fit the librarians' /
theoretical classifications, such a procedure would have no warrant /
in either fact or logic.
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